

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 4

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Volume III

The International Week

Strong British resistance dimmed the chances for OEEC agreement on ECA's proposals for more effective economic integration of Western Europe. The French National Assembly finally ratified the 8 March 1949 accords with the Bao Dai regime in Indochina. Meanwhile the UN failed to mark any progress in dealing with the Chinese seating problem and the Soviet walkout.

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Eritrean understanding achieved. Italian and Ethiopian representatives in Geneva have reached tentative working level agreement that neither government will support or encourage any political activity or propaganda concerning Eritrea during the UN Commission's investigation and the preparation of its report. Both also agree not to support any particular disposition of the territory prior to the Commission's own recommendations. Representatives of the two parties will undertake, through US and UK good offices, further consultations prior to the consideration of the Commission's report by the GA Interim Committee after 15 June 1950. Both the US and the UK still favor the award of all Eritrea but the western provinces to Ethiopia, and Italy has indicated that it might be able to accept federation of the territory with the Ethiopian Emperor. Thus, the way is being cleared for a GA decision acceptable to all the parties concerned.

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Yugoslavs meddle in Kashmir case. Informal Yugoslav proposals behind the scenes in New York are serving to give the Indians support from an unexpected quarter. The Tito delegation at first contacted Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmir Premier, and suggested independence for Kashmir as a means of settlement. Later, the Yugoslavs made another proposal which has already obtained a favorable reaction from the Indian government since it advocates an entirely new SC approach to the case. The Yugoslavs propose that a three-man mediation commission be sent to the sub-continent with each party to the dispute designating one member and these two selecting a third. The Indians have been stubbornly holding out against an over-all plebiscite and such a fresh start with a new commission with broad instructions would presumably permit

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abandonment of this principle and open the way for the partition and limited plebiscite which India favors. This independent Yugoslav move has alarmed the Pakistanis who recognize that it offers India an opportunity it has been waiting for. So far India has evaded the necessity of publicly making new proposals to replace the plebiscite agreement. With the Yugoslavs playing close to India, Nehru would welcome an SC member willing to introduce new proposals for him.

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Communist drive against MDAP shipments not attracting wide support. Communist preparations for work stoppages in Western European ports at the time of the first MDAP shipments are winning relatively little support from the dockers and transport workers. The former French Air Minister, a Communist, failed to rally Cherbourg dockers who had rejected an earlier Communist demand that they refuse to unload arms shipments. In Antwerp Socialist dock chiefs are confident that the first MDAP cargoes will be unloaded after initial disturbances and work stoppages not exceeding 24-48 hours. In Italy Communist orders for port strikes on arrival of the MDAP shipments may be effective in some northern ports but will not be generally supported in southern Italian ports. Although Moscow has reportedly placed a special "solidarity" fund of \$250,000 at the WFTU's disposal for disbursement to dockers and their families in the event of a prolonged strike, a major Communist financial effort is unlikely unless the local "action committees" obtain wider support among the rank-and-file. Moreover, in the face of the Communist failure at Cherbourg, the small turn-out at "peace" demonstrations of the railroad unions, and tightening security measures, it is more probable that the WFTU funds will be used to finance a preliminary trial of Communist strength in a few ports. The relatively greater sums which would be required to back a prolonged general maritime strike will apparently be withheld pending the outcome of this initial effort.

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Security Council stymied. Despite broad assertions of many delegates that the SC must establish its right to take substantive action in the absence of the USSR, that body has been at a virtual standstill. While renewed debate on the Kashmir case is anticipated, there is little chance that any membership applications will be pressed. Similarly, the Commission for Conventional Armaments is not likely to meet in February as China is to have the chair, and six-power discussions on atomic energy have been completely disrupted by the Soviet walkout. Thus, although the value of Soviet participation in these bodies is highly controversial, the boycott has nevertheless had considerable effect. By contrast, the effectiveness of the Trusteeship Council and of several ECOSOC committees has been relatively unimpaired.

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SOVIET BOYCOTT OF THE UN

Apart from the obvious purpose of embarrassing the US, the Soviet UN boycott was probably designed, among other things, to delay indefinitely US recognition of the PRC as part of a concerted Soviet effort to isolate China from western influence, at least during the initial consolidation of Soviet influence. The Soviets may feel that indefinite postponement of US recognition of the Chinese communist government would seriously restrict US capabilities of encouraging the development of Titoism in China. Additional indications of Soviet attempts to discourage Chinese relations with the West are the cool PRC response to UK recognition and the Chinese communist recognition of Ho Chi Minh, which hardly seems designed to hasten French recognition of the PRC.

The effect of the complete Soviet bloc boycott of all UN organs, the strongest action thus far taken by the USSR in the UN, is to dramatize Soviet pressure on the West. This action in conjunction with seizure of US consular property in Peiping and mistreatment of US officials in China, makes US recognition of the PRC increasingly difficult in the face of hostility in Congress and the press. The USSR is thus creating a situation in which US recognition of the PRC would be construed and certainly widely propagandized as an outright surrender to Soviet pressure.

The Soviet UN walkout, although ostensibly designed to force early unseating of the Nationalist delegates in the UN, thus actually has the effect of delaying rather than expediting the shift from Nationalist to Communist representation in the UN. Had the USSR merely introduced a resolution seeking the ouster of the Nationalists and not walked out of the UN, the Chinese Communists would have replaced the Nationalists in the normal course of events. Now, however, Soviet pressures and deliberate moves by the PRC to antagonize the western powers are increasing the political difficulties for UN members in accepting as gracefully as possible the shift from Nationalist to Communist representation.

The Soviet move to forestall US recognition seems to be part of a general policy of discouraging Western contacts with Soviet satellite states. It falls in line with the Soviet policy of isolating US diplomatic missions in Eastern Europe by reducing the number of US officials, restricting their freedom of movement and attempting to discredit them in the eyes of the local population by linking them with "reactionary" espionage and subversive plots. To keep China free of US officials during the early stages of Communist consolidation by delaying the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC is an easier method of decreasing US influence than the policy of progressive restrictions now being pursued in the European satellites. Moreover, this method would appear to place the blame on the US for refusing, for political reasons, to recognize the de facto government of China rather than subjecting the Communists to charges of violating customary diplomatic practices as is the case in Eastern Europe at present.